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1		ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 22/WG 23 N 0322					
2	ļ	Proposed vulnerability description on Inter-language calling					
3							
		Date	23 March 2011				
		Contributed by	Secretary				
		Original file name					
4		Notes	Meeting #17 markup of N0310				
4 5							
6		6.X Inter-language Calling [DJS]					
7		•					
8		6.x.1 Description of	application vulnerability				
9		When an application	is developed using more than one programming language, complications arise.				
10		The calling conventions, data layout, error handing and return conventions all differ between					
11	ļ		re not addressed correctly, stack overflow/underflow, data corruption, and				
12		memory corruption a					
13 14		In multi-language dev object code across the	velopment environment <u>s</u> it is also difficult to reuse <del>code <u>data</u> structures and</del>				
	ļ	<u>object code</u> del 035 til	e iunguuges.				
15		6.x.2 Cross referenc	e				
16		[None]					
1 7							
17		6.x.3 Mechanism of					
18 19			on that has been developed using a language different from the calling language,				
20	the call convention and the return convention used must be taken into account. If these conventions are not handled correctly, there is a good chance the calling stack will be corrupted, see [OTR]. The						
21	l	call convention cover	s how the language invokes the call, see [CJS], but and how the parameters are				
22		handled.					
23 24	ļ		ages have restriction on <u>restrict the</u> length of identifiers, the type of characters e first character, and the case of the characters used. All of these need to be				
25	l		nen invoking a routine written in a language other than the calling language.				
26			iers might bind in a manner different than intended.				
27	•		ate data types require special treatment in a multi-language development				
28 29			ata layout of all languages that are to be used must be taken into consideration, g and alignment. If these data types are not handled correctly, the data could be				
30	ļ		ry could be corrupted, or both may become corrupt. This can happen by				
31	ļ	writing/reading past	either end of the data structure, see [HCB]. For example, a Pascal's STRING				
32		data type					
33	l		STRING(10);-				
34		corresponds to a C str	ructure				
35		struct {					
36 37		int len char st					
38	1	};					

- 38 39

40	and not to the C structure	~	Formatted: Font: Cambria			
41 42	<u>char str [10]</u>		Formatted: Indent: Left: 0", Space Before: 0.01 line, After: 6 pt			
43	-where length contains the actual length of STRING. The second C construct is implemented with					
44 45	a physical length that is different from physical length of the Pascal STRING and assumes a null terminator.		Formatted: Font: Courier New			
46 47 48	Most numeric data types have counterparts across languages, but again the layout should be understood, and only those types that match the languages should be used. For example, in some implementations of C++ a					
49	signed char					
50	would match a Fortran					
51	integer(1)INTEGER*1					
52	and would match a Pascal					
53	PACKED -128127					
54	Tthese correspondences can be implementation-defined and should be verified.		Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 10 pt, Font color: Black			
55	6.x.4 Applicable language characteristics					
56 57 58 59	<ul> <li>The vulnerability is applicable to languages with the following characteristics:</li> <li>All high level programming languages and low level programming languages are susceptible to this vulnerability when used in a multi-language development environment.</li> </ul>					
60	6.x.5 Avoiding the vulnerability or mitigating its effects					
61 62 63 64	<ul> <li>Software developers can avoid the vulnerability or mitigate its ill effects in the following ways:         <ul> <li>Use the inter-language methods and syntax specified by the applicable language standard(s). For </li> <li>example, Fortran and Ada specify how to call C.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Understand the calling convents conventions of all languages used.</li> </ul>		Formatted: List Paragraph, Bulleted + Level: 1 + Aligned at: 0.25" + Indent at: 0.5"			
65	For items comprising the inter-language interface:	Ì	Formatted: Bullets and Numbering			
66	Understand the data layout of all data types used.		Formatted: Indent: Left: 0.5"			
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74	<ul> <li>Understand the return conventions of all languages used.</li> <li>Ensure that the language in which error check occurs is the one that handles the error.</li> <li>Avoid using uppercase lettersassuming that the language makes a distinction between upper case and lower case letters in identifiers.</li> <li>Avoid using the underscore (_) and dollar sign (\$)a special character as the first character in identifiers.</li> <li>Avoid using long identifier names.</li> </ul>					
75	6.x.6 Implications for standardization					
76 77	In future standardization activities, the following items should be considered:					
78	<ul> <li>Standards committees should consider developing guides standard provisions for inter-language calling with languages most often used with their programming language.</li> </ul>					
79						